moai-ref-supply-chain

Provides defensive reference patterns for securing software supply chains with SBOM, SLSA, and Sigstore.

Updated Mar 22, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/taewook486/Masters_degree --skill moai-ref-supply-chain-taewook486
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent▼
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: moai-ref-supply-chain
Source: https://github.com/taewook486/Masters_degree/tree/main/.claude/skills/moai-ref-supply-chain
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/taewook486/Masters_degree --skill moai-ref-supply-chain-taewook486

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve? Modern software depends on untrusted supply chains where dependencies can be substituted, builds tampered with, and artifacts impersonated. This Skill gives an AI agent production-grade defensive knowledge to generate and verify SBOMs, block dependency confusion and typosquatting, triage suspicious packages, enforce SLSA provenance levels, and verify Sigstore signatures before artifacts reach production. ## Core Features & Use Cases - SBOM Generation & Verification: Guidance on SPDX vs CycloneDX selection, NTIA minimum elements, build-time generation, and signed SBOM attestations. - Dependency-Confusion & Typosquatting Defense: Namespace scoping, source pinning, lockfile hash-pinning, and name-similarity checks to prevent package substitution. - Malicious-Package Triage Playbook: Detection signals (maintainer changes, install scripts, network access) and a five-step quarantine-to-report response procedure. - SLSA & Sigstore Verification: Provenance level requirements (L0-L3) and cosign keyless signing verification with expected signer identity pinning. - Use Case: Before adding a new npm dependency, ask the agent to triage it — it will check for typosquat signals, verify provenance, and confirm the lockfile pins content hashes. ## Quick Start Ask the agent to audit your project's dependency and release pipeline for supply-chain risks and produce a hardening checklist covering SBOM generation, hash pinning, and artifact signature verification.

Frequently Asked Questions about moai-ref-supply-chain

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I generate an SBOM for my software project?▼

Generate an SBOM at build time using a tool like syft, which emits both SPDX and CycloneDX formats. Include the NTIA minimum elements such as supplier, version, and dependency relationships, and attach it as a signed attestation so consumers can trust the inventory.

What is the difference between SPDX and CycloneDX SBOM formats?▼

SPDX, stewarded by the Linux Foundation and standardized as ISO/IEC 5962, is license-centric with broad regulatory acceptance. CycloneDX, from OWASP, is security-centric with native vulnerability and dependency-relationship modeling. Choose based on ecosystem fit and consumer needs.

How do I prevent dependency confusion attacks?▼

Prevent dependency confusion by reserving your organization's namespace on public registries, configuring resolvers to fetch internal names only from the internal registry, and pinning every dependency by content hash in the lockfile so same-name substitutions fail verification.

What SLSA level should production artifacts require?▼

Production environments typically require SLSA Build L2 or higher, meaning signed provenance from a hosted build platform. High-assurance environments require L3, where the build runs in an isolated, ephemeral environment with non-forgeable provenance.

How does Sigstore cosign verify software artifacts?▼

Cosign verifies an artifact's signature and checks the signer identity against an expected identity policy using keyless signing with short-lived OIDC-bound certificates. Verification should happen at install or admission time, failing closed on unsigned or wrong-identity artifacts.

When should I not use this supply-chain security reference?▼

This reference does not cover offensive techniques, LLM or AI-specific security such as model provenance, web application OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, or general API design. Those topics belong to separate dedicated references.