What problem does it solve? When a user changes their password or a refresh token is reused (a theft signal), previously issued access tokens remain valid until expiry, leaving a security gap. This Skill documents the discipline of propagating a per-user timestamp epoch through token issuance and validation so outstanding tokens are rejected immediately. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Epoch-Based Invalidation: Adds a password_changed_at column to the users table and rejects any JWT whose iat predates that epoch with a 401. - Cache Coherence: Invalidates the active-user cache on password change and on epoch-check rejection so stale cached users cannot bypass the new epoch. - Anti-Pattern Guidance: Warns against storing the epoch in a separate table, using a separate epoch token, or catching BaseException. - Use Case: After implementing a POST /auth/change-password endpoint or refresh-token reuse detection, apply this pattern so all tokens issued before the event are rejected on their next use. ## Quick Start Apply the auth-timestamp-invalidation pattern to my password change endpoint so outstanding access tokens are rejected with 401.