active-directory

Explains Active Directory protocol internals and telemetry for writing detection rules.

Updated Jun 24, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/opentidehq/skills --skill active-directory-opentidehq
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent▼
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: active-directory
Source: https://github.com/opentidehq/skills/tree/main/skills/active-directory
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/opentidehq/skills --skill active-directory-opentidehq

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve? Detection engineers often write rules that match specific attacker tools instead of the underlying protocol abuse, leaving gaps that trivial tool changes evade. This Skill provides the Active Directory internals — Kerberos, NTLM, replication, delegation, GPO, AD CS, and LDAP — needed to author detections grounded in protocol behavior and the correct Windows Event IDs. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Protocol-level attack mechanics: Covers Kerberos flows (AS-REQ/TGT/TGS), Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, NTLM relay and pass-the-hash, DCSync, DCShadow, delegation abuse (unconstrained/constrained/RBCD), and AD CS escalation paths ESC1–ESC13. - Telemetry mapping: Maps each attack technique to concrete detection signals such as Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771, 4776, 4662, 5136, and 4886/4887, including replication GUIDs and encryption-type anomalies. - Use Case: When writing a Kerberoasting detection, use this Skill to confirm that EID 4769 with RC4 encryption type 0x17 is the right signal, and to check for false positives from legacy applications before deploying the rule. ## Quick Start Ask the agent to explain how to detect DCSync attacks using domain controller event logs and which Event IDs and replication GUIDs to alert on.

Frequently Asked Questions about active-directory

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I detect Kerberoasting with Windows Event IDs?▼

Detect Kerberoasting by alerting on Event ID 4769 (service ticket request) with encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC). Modern environments should use AES (0x12), so RC4 requests for service accounts are anomalous, though legacy applications may need auditing first.

How to detect DCSync attacks on domain controllers?▼

Detect DCSync via Event ID 4662 where the Properties field contains replication GUIDs {1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} or {1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} and the source account is not a domain controller.

What Event IDs indicate NTLM relay or pass-the-hash attacks?▼

Pass-the-hash shows as Event ID 4776 (NTLM validation) from unexpected sources, while NTLM relay appears as Event ID 4624 Type 3 logons where the source IP does not match the expected client. NTLM usage where Kerberos should be available is also suspicious.

Which AD CS misconfigurations should detection engineers monitor?▼

Monitor ESC1 through ESC13 paths, especially templates allowing requestor-supplied SANs (ESC1), template ACL modification (ESC4), and HTTP/RPC enrollment endpoints vulnerable to NTLM relay (ESC8, ESC11). Relevant events include 4886/4887 for certificate requests and 4899 for template changes.

Can LDAP reconnaissance be detected in Windows event logs?▼

Yes, via Event ID 1644, but it requires diagnostic LDAP query logging to be enabled on domain controllers. High-volume or highly specific queries — such as SPN enumeration or Domain Admin membership lookups — from non-admin workstations are the key signals.

What are the limitations of detecting Golden Ticket attacks?▼

Golden Tickets produce no direct event because the TGT is forged offline with the krbtgt hash. Detection relies on anomalies such as TGT lifetime deviations, TGTs issued to non-existent accounts, or service ticket requests without a prior AS-REQ.